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1 Introduction
The pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical integration have attracted a lot of attention
in both antitrust theory and practice. The most well-known anti-competitive effect of
vertical integration is that it "raises rival’s cost": When an upstream firm integrates with a
downstream firm, it increases the input price that it charges to its unintegrated downstream
rivals, and thus, it raises their cost. By raising the rivals’ cost, the vertically integrated firm
forecloses its downstream rivals from the market and enjoys higher downstream profits.1
In this paper, we show that vertical integration decreases instead of raises the rivals’
cost. We do so incorporating the fact that vertical integration can result into R&D knowl-
edge disclosure. In particular, we take into account that when two vertically related firms
integrate, information flow among them gets easier (e.g., the merged firms may integrate
their IT networks). As a result, the upstream subsidiary of the integrated entity gets in-
formed about its downstream partner’s R&D activities and has the option of disclosing its
knowledge to its downstream customers-rivals. We investigate whether vertical integration
may result into such knowledge disclosure, as well as the incentives and implications of
vertical integration.
Empirical evidence suggests that sharing of R&D knowledge is not restricted to research
joint ventures or technical consortia. Firms often purposefully disclose their knowledge to
their rivals (see e.g., Lhuillery, 2006, Penin, 2007), as well as to their customers/suppliers in
the vertical supply chain (see e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002, Harhoff et al., 2003, Bonte
and Keilbach, 2005). Interestingly, a number of real world cases indicate that vertically
integrated firms also reveal their knowledge to their downstream customers-rivals. For
instance, in the market for web-based applications for business clients, Google is both a
producer and a direct retailer of its applications. There are several other independent
resellers of Google’s applications authorized by Google. Clearly, these resellers are both
customers and rivals of Google. In 2009, Google developed a program through which Google
offers training, support, and tools for sales and marketing to its resellers.2 In other words,
Google shares with its downstream customers-rivals knowledge that it has developed on its
own as a retailer. Similarly, McAfee, the producer of security software, although it sells its
1A number of papers develop this point in depth (see e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990, Ordover et al., 1990
and 1992, Rey and Tirole, 2007).
2For additional information see http://www.searchengineworld.com/google/3459069.htm as well as
http://www.informationweek.com/news/development/mobility/231900685.
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products on its own, it also offers training and marketing support to resellers of its products
through its resellers partner program.3
We consider a framework in which an upstream monopolist sells an essential input to
two competing downstream firms. Initially, we assume that only one of the downstream
firms enjoys a cost-advantage due to an exogenous innovation. The upstream monopolist
is considering integrating with the more efficient downstream firm. If they integrate, the
integrated firm decides whether it will disclose its knowledge regarding the innovation of its
downstream partner to its non-integrated downstream rival. If it discloses, the downstream
rival will also enjoy the cost-advantage. After the integration decision, firms set the terms
of vertical trade and compete in quantities. We also consider a richer framework in which
we allow for endogenous R&D investments by both downstream firms, as well as for partial
knowledge disclosure under vertical integration. Throughout, we focus on the case in which
disclosure takes place for free, i.e., we abstract from licensing. This allows us to isolate the
strategic effects of disclosure and to point out that it can be motivated by other incentives
besides the licensing fees revenue.
Surprisingly, we demonstrate that the vertically integrated firm fully discloses its knowl-
edge to its downstream rival. Knowledge disclosure increases the downstream rival’s effi-
ciency. From the vertically integrated firm’s viewpoint, this has two opposite effects. First, it
intensifies downstream competition and decreases the integrated firm’s downstream market
share and profits. Second, it expands the downstream demand and increases the integrated
firm’s upstream profits. The expansion of the downstream demand compensates the evasion
in market share and full disclosure takes place.
Importantly, in contrast to the established view in the literature that vertical integration
raises the rival’s cost, we show that vertical integration always decreases the rival’s cost.
Under vertical integration, the vertically integrated firm increases the input price, causing
an increase in the rival’s cost. At the same time though, it discloses all its knowledge to the
rival downstream firm, decreasing the latter’s cost. The decrease in the rival’s production
cost turns out to be larger than the increase due the input price. We should note that the
negative impact of vertical integration on the rival’s cost depends crucially on the fact that
we allow for the possibility of knowledge disclosure. If we had ignored this possibility, in
line with the related literature, we would have found that vertical integration leads to a
3This can be seen at http://www.mcafee.com/us/partners/reseller-partners.
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raise in rival’s cost. Clearly then, taking into account the fact that vertical integration can
give rise to the possibility of knowledge disclosure is an issue of great importance in the
evaluation of the implications of vertical integration.
When innovation is endogenous, knowledge disclosure can reinforce the R&D invest-
ments of both downstream firms. For the non-integrated downstream firm, this result is
quite intuitive: Since knowledge disclosure translates into free-riding on the integrated firm’s
R&D investments, it decreases its marginal cost. The latter effect results in an increase in
its output, which reinforces the value of any cost reduction and causes an increase in its
R&D investments. For the vertically integrated firm this result is counter-intuitive because
the free-riding of its rival on its own R&D investments clearly weakens its investments
incentives. However, knowledge disclosure increases the efficiency of the downstream rival
and allows the vertically integrated firm to charge a higher wholesale price that results
into higher profits from input sales. This effect reinforces the vertically integrated firm’s
investment incentives.
In light of the above, this paper identifies a number of pro-competitive effects of ver-
tical integration that make it desirable from a welfare viewpoint. Vertical integration by
eliminating double marginalization and by leading to knowledge disclosure, improves the
efficiency of the downstream firms, increases the size of the downstream market and benefits
both firms and consumers.
Our above mentioned insights carry over to trading through other types of contracts,
such as two-part tariff contracts, and to downstream competition in prices instead of quan-
tities. Moreover, they are robust when the disclosure decision is taken after firms’ R&D
investments, as well when R&D investments are research substitutes instead of research
complements.
There is an emerging literature on knowledge disclosure in vertically related industries.
Bonte and Wiethaus (2007) and Harhoff et al. (2003) consider an industry where an up-
stream monopolist sells an input to two downstream firms. The downstream firms have
some exogenous R&D knowledge and choose the amount of knowledge that they will trans-
fer to the upstream firm. In Bonte and Wiethaus (2007), the upstream firm, in turn, chooses
how much of the knowledge that it obtained from a downstream firm it will transmit to
the rival downstream firm. In Harhoff et al. (2003) instead, the disclosure to the upstream
input manufacturer automatically triggers a complete spillover to the other downstream
firm. None of these papers allows for vertical integration, and thus, none of them examines
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how vertical integration affects the diffusion of downstream innovation.
The literature on vertical integration and market foreclosure abstracts, to a large extend,
from the possibility of knowledge disclosure due to vertical integration.4 Exceptions include
the papers by Hughes and Kao (2001), Milliou (2004), and Allain et al. (2011). In partic-
ular, Hughes and Kao (2001) consider an industry with three asymmetric upstream firms
and two downstream firms, one of which has private demand information. They allow for
vertical integration among the more efficient upstream firm and the uniformed downstream
firm and examine whether the upstream entity of the integrated firm has incentives to share
with its downstream entity the demand information that it learns through its trading with
the informed non-integrated downstream firm. Milliou (2004) and Allain et al. (2011)
examine how the information flow from a downstream non-integrated firm to the down-
stream division of a vertically integrated firm regarding the former’s R&D investments, via
its upstream subsidiary, affects downstream R&D investments, profits and welfare. Milliou
(2004) considers a market structure similar to ours and demonstrates that information flow
can enhance firms’ R&D investments. Allain et al. (2011) allow instead for an alternative
upstream supplier at which downstream customers can turn under vertical integration in
order to avoid information flow at the expense of having to pay a higher input price. All of
these papers consider knowledge disclosure from the rival downstream non-integrated firm
to the downstream integrated firm and tend, under certain circumstances, to provide an
argument against vertical integration. Instead, we consider the reverse direction of knowl-
edge disclosure, from the downstream integrated firm to the downstream non-integrated
firm and identify a novel argument in favor of vertical integration.
Our paper relates also to the literature on licensing. Within this literature, a number
of papers (see e.g., Lemarie, 2005, Arya and Mittendorf, 2006, Fauli-Oller and Sandonis,
2006) study the incentives and the implications of vertical integration when an upstream
monopolist sells its innovation to downstream firms through a licensing contract. Our
paper differs from this literature in many aspects. Importantly, in this literature knowledge
transmission to the downstream rivals is mainly motivated by the revenues generated from
the licensing fees. In our paper, we abstract from such incentives. Moreover, whereas in
this literature innovation is upstream and trading is possible only if there is licensing, in our
paper innovation is downstream and firms trade even in the absence of knowledge disclosure.
4For an in depth review of this literature see Rey and Tirole (2007) and Riordan (2008).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we analyze the
disclosure incentives, as well as the implications and incentives of vertical integration with
exogenous and endogenous innovation respectively. In Section 4, we extend our analysis in
various ways. We conclude in Section 5. The proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Vertical Separation Vs. Vertical Integration and Knowl-
edge Disclosure with Exogenous Innovation
To demonstrate in a more clear way the main intuition of our paper, in this Section, we
analyze briefly a simple model in which one of the downstream firms is endowed with an
exogenous innovation and there is full or none knowledge disclosure under vertical integra-
tion.
In particular, we consider a two-tier industry consisting, initially, by an upstream mo-
nopolist, denoted by  , and two downstream firms, each denoted by , with  = 1 2. The
upstream firm sells an essential input to the downstream firms which transform it into a
final product in a one-to-one proportion.
Each  faces the following (inverse) demand function:
( ) = −  −     = 1 2  6=  0   ≤ 1 (1)
where  and  are respectively the price and the quantity of ’s product and  is the
quantity of  ’s product. The parameter  measures the degree of product differentiation:
The higher is , the closer substitutes the two products are.
 ’s production cost is normalized to zero. Instead, 1’s and 2’s marginal production
costs are  −∆+ 1 and + 2 respectively. Parameter  denotes an exogenous constant
marginal cost, ∆, with 0  ∆   the outcome of the innovation possessed only by 1,
and  the wholesale price that  pays per unit of input to  , i.e., linear wholesale price
contracts are used.
 can integrate with one of the downstream firms. Clearly, it prefers to integrate with
the more efficient downstream firm, i.e., with 1. Vertical integration brings about two
important changes. First, the input is transferred at marginal cost within the vertical
integrated entity, denoted by  − 1. Thus, the latter’s marginal cost becomes  − ∆.
Second, due to the information flow between the upstream and downstream units of the
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integrated entity,  gains access to the outcome of the 1’s innovation. This gives  the
option of disclosing what it learned to its downstream customer-rival 2.5 In particular,
under vertical integration, 2’s marginal cost becomes −∆+2 with  ∈ {0 1}. Without
disclosure,  = 0, while with disclosure,  = 1.
Firms play a three-stage game with observable actions. In stage 1,  and 1 decide
whether they will integrate. If they integrate, the vertically integrated firm decides whether
it will disclose its knowledge to 2. In stage 2, under vertical separation,  makes simulta-
neous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the downstream firms regarding 1 and 2. Under vertical
integration,  − 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer only to 2 regarding 2. Lastly, in
stage 3, downstream firms compete in quantities.
Under vertical separation, in the final stage, each  solves the following problem:
max (    ) = ( ) − ( ) (2)
where 1(1 1) = (−∆+ 1)1 and 2(2 2) = (+2)2.
In stage 2,  faces the following problem:
max12  (1 2) = 11(1 2) + 22(1 2) (3)
where ( ) is the solution of (2). The equilibrium wholesale prices, quantities and
firms’ profits are reported in Appendix A1.
Under vertical integration, in stage 3,  −1 and 2 face the following problems:
max1  (1 2 2 ) = 1(1 2)1 − (−∆)1 + 22; (4)
max2 2(1 2 2 ) = 2(1 2)2 − (− ∆+ 2)2 (5)
Solving we obtain (2 ). In the previous stage,  −1 chooses 2:
max2  (2 ) = [1(2 )]
2 + 22(2 ) (6)
5 It is natural to think that once two firms start operating as an integrated entity, they get informed about
the characteristics of each other - they exchange more information. Alternatively, we could have assumed
that even without integration,  , in its role as a supplier of 1 and 2, has some knowledge regarding
their innovations. Again though integration increases  ’s knowledge regarding its downstream partner’s
innovation relative to the knowledge that it has regarding its downstream rival’s innovation.
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The resulting equilibrium values are included in Appendix A1.6
We note that there is full market foreclosure,  2 () ≤ 0, when ∆ ≤ ∆ () ≡ −( −
)(1−)(−). This implies that when there is full knowledge disclosure ( = 1), vertical
integration never drives 2 out of the market, ∆ (1)  0. It also implies that if there is
no knowledge disclosure ( = 0), vertical integration drives the downstream non-integrated
firm out of the market when the level of exogenous innovation is too high. Part of our
subsequent analysis is performed under the following assumption:
Assumption 1: ∆  ∆ (0) ≡ (− )(1− ).
Surprisingly, under Assumption 1, we find that  (1) −  (0)  0. In other words,
we find that the vertically integrated firm is better off when instead of protecting its own
downstream innovation by keeping it in house, it reveals it to its downstream rival. Intu-
itively, disclosure makes the downstream non-integrated rival more efficient. This means
that disclosure intensifies downstream competition, and thus, has a negative impact on
the vertically integrated firm’s downstream profits. However, it also means that disclosure
augments the downstream market size and results into an increase in the integrated firm’s
profits from input sales - in fact, both the wholesale price and 2’s quantity are higher with
disclosure. The latter positive effect compensates for the loss in downstream profits and
makes disclosure attractive.
As mentioned above, when  = 1, Assumption 1 is satisfied and vertical integration does
not lead to full market foreclosure. However, the vertically integrated entity might prefer
setting  = 0 in order that Assumption 1 is not always satisfied. In that case, it will be a
monopolist with profits   = (−+∆)24. Comparing  (1) with   , we conclude that
the vertically integrated entity never chooses to fully foreclose its downstream rival. If the
vertically integrated firm fully forecloses its downstream rival, it will enjoy monopoly profits
from the downstream market and null profits from the upstream market. The latter, as we
saw above, are higher with knowledge disclosure. In fact, they are so high that the vertically
integrated firm chooses not to sacrifice them through foreclosure. If we did not allow for
the possibility of disclosure, we would predict that full market foreclosure could arise in
equilibrium. Therefore, allowing for this possibility, we demonstrate that vertical integration
never results into full market foreclosure. Importantly, we also demonstrate that vertical
6All the statements which are made in the rest of this Section follow from simple comparisons of the
relevant expressions reported in Appendix A1.
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integration decreases, instead of raising, its downstream rival’s cost, i.e., −∆+ 2 (1) 
+  2 .
Given its implications, vertical integration is always desirable from  and1’ viewpoint,
 (1) − (  +  1 )  0. Integration not only solves the double marginalization prob-
lem, but it also increases the upstream profits of the integrated entity due to the induced
knowledge disclosure. Vertical integration is also desirable from 2’s viewpoint as long
as the cost-reducing outcome of the exogenous innovation is sufficiently low. Intuitively,
as vertical integration induces knowledge disclosure, it increases the absolute efficiency of
2, tending to increase its output and profits. However, a high cost-reducing outcome of
innovation allows the integrated entity to charge a high input price, thus deteriorating 2’s
relative efficiency and, in turn, decreasing its output and profits. Consumers are also better
off when vertical integration materializes. This occurs because both firms face lower cost
under vertical integration, and thus, they produce more,   (1)    . In light of the
above, it is not surprising that vertical integration enhances total welfare.
3 Vertical Separation Vs. Vertical Integration and Knowl-
edge Disclosure with Endogenous Innovation
In this Section, we consider a richer framework in which we endogenize the innovation
of both downstream firms and we allow for partial knowledge disclosure under vertical
integration.
In particular, we consider the same market structure as in Section 2. However, we assume
now that under vertical separation’s variable production cost is ( ) = (+−),
where  is the level of ’s endogenous R&D investments.
Respectively, under vertical integration, we assume that the variable cost of  −1 is
( − 1)1 while that of 2’s is ( + 2 − 2 − 1)2, where  is the degree of knowledge
that  discloses to 2 regarding 1’s R&D investments. As mentioned above, we allow
now for partial disclosure, i.e., 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
As standard in the literature (see e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), we assume
that the cost of the R&D investments is quadratic, and more specifically, it is given by 2 .
In terms of timing of moves, we add a stage, just after stage 1, in which firms simulta-
neously and independently choose their R&D investments 1 and 2. The rest of the game
remains the same.
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3.1 Vertical Separation
When  and 1 remain separated, in the last stage, each  faces the following problem:
max (       ) = ( ) − (+ − ) − 
2  (7)
Solving we obtain (    ). In stage 3,  chooses the wholesale prices in order to
maximize its profits:
max12  (1 2 1 2) = 11(1 2 1 2) + 22(1 2 1 2) (8)
Solving we obtain ( ) Finally, maximizing, in stage 2, ’s profits in terms of , we
obtain the equilibrium R&D investments, and in turn, the equilibrium wholesale prices and
quantities:
  = − 15 + 2(4− (2 + )) (9)
  = (− )(2− )(2 + )
2
15 + 2(4− (2 + )) ; 
  =
(− )(4− 2)
15 + 2(4− (2 + )) (10)
Note that 
   0 if and only if   23 .7
3.2 Vertical Integration and Disclosure Incentives
Under vertical integration, in the last stage, the two firms solve the following problems:
max1  (1 2 2 1 2 ) = 1(1 2)1 − (− 1)1 +22 − 
2
1; (11)
max2 2(1 2 2 1 2 ) = 2(1 2)2 − (+ 2 − 2 − 1)2 − 
2
2 (12)
The resulting equilibrium quantities are (2 1 2 ). In the previous stage,  − 1
chooses the wholesale price that it charges to 2:
max2  (2 1 2 ) = [1(2 1 2 )]
2 +22(2 1 2 )− 21
7 I.e., there is a U-shaped relation between the R&D investments and the intensity of downstream com-
petition. This is in line with Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) who consider the relationship between R&D
investments and product differentiation in a one-tier industry.
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The solution is:
2(1 2 ) = (− )(8− (4− )
2) + 8(2 + 1)− 2(42 + 41 − 1)
16− 62  (13)
One can easily note that 2  0, 2  0, and 
22  0 for  = 1 2. The latter implies
that the positive impact of the R&D investments on the wholesale price gets stronger when
knowledge disclosure increases.
Finally, maximizing the vertically integrated and non-integrated downstream firms’ prof-
its in terms of 1 and 2 respectively, we obtain the equilibrium R&D investments as a
function of :
 1 () = (− )[60 + 4(1− )(8− 3
2)− (32 + (16− 3(4− )))]
180− 1762 + 394 + 4(4 − )(8− 32) ; (14)
 2 () = 4(− )(3 +  − 4)180− 1762 + 394 + 4(4 − )(8− 32)  (15)
The resulting equilibrium wholesale price and quantities are:
 2 () = 2(− )[48 + (2 +  − )(8− 3
2)− [4 + (50− (8 + 3(4− )))]]
180− 1762 + 394 + 4(4 − )(8− 32) ;(16)
 1 () = (− )[(2− )[60 + (10− 3(9 + 2))]− (8− 3
2)(2 − 2− )]
180− 1762 + 394 + 4(4 − )(8− 32) ; (17)
 2 () = 2(− )(3 +  − 4)(8− 3
2)
180− 1762 + 394 + 4(4 − )(8− 32)  (18)
Note that  2 () ≤ 0, i.e., there is full market foreclosure, when  ≥  () ≡ (3 + )4.
This implies that if there is no knowledge disclosure ( = 0), vertical integration drives the
non-integrated downstream out of the market when downstream competition is sufficiently
strong, and in particular, if and only if  ≥ 75. However, it also implies that full market
foreclosure is less likely, the higher is knowledge disclosure. In fact,  (1) = 1. Thus,
similarly to the model with exogenous innovation, when there is full knowledge disclosure
( = 1), vertical integration never drives 2 out of the market. We make the following
assumption in part of our subsequent analysis:
Assumption 2:    () ≡ (3 + )4
Next, we examine how knowledge disclosure influences firms’ equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 2,
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(i) the downstream non-integrated firm’s R&D investments  2 () always increase in ,
(ii) the vertically integrated firm’s R&D investments  1 () increase in  except if, for
given   is sufficiently high,
(iii) the downstream non-integrated firm’s effective R&D investments  2 () +  1 ()
always increase in ,
(iv) the wholesale price charged to the downstream non-integrated firm  2 () always
increases in 
(v) the downstream non-integrated firm’s unit cost + 2 ()− 2 ()− 1 () always
decreases in ,
(vi) the downstream non-integrated firm’s output  2 () always increases in ,
(vii) the vertically integrated firm’s output  1 () increases in  except if, for given  
is sufficiently high.
Proposition 1(i) asserts that the more knowledge is transferred to 2, the more 2
invests in R&D. Intuitively, 2’s marginal cost is reduced due to the free-riding on the
R&D investments of −1. The decrease in its marginal cost results into an increase in its
output, which in turn reinforces the value of any cost reduction, and induces an increase in
its own R&D investments. This effect is often referred to as output effect (see e.g., Bester
and Petrakis, 1993, Milliou, 2004).
Interestingly, an increase in knowledge disclosure can reinforce the investment incentives
of the integrated firm too (Proposition 1(ii)). This holds unless products are sufficiently close
substitutes. The intuition is as follows. An increase in knowledge disclosure has two opposite
effects. First, it translates into an increase in the free-riding of the rival downstream firm,
and thus, it weakens the integrated firm’s investments incentives. Second, as we saw above,
it intensifies the positive impact of an increase in the integrated firm’s R&D investments
on the input price. Therefore, it leads to higher profits from input sales and, in turn,
reinforces the integrated firm’s investment incentives. When downstream competition is
not too strong, the first negative effect is weak and it is outweighed by the second positive
effect. We should point out that this finding is in contrast with respective findings in one-
tier industries (see e.g., Milliou, 2009) and in vertically related industries in the absence
of vertical integration.8 In light of the above, it is not surprising that the effective R&D
investments of the downstream non-integrated firm, that is, the total cost reduction that
8This last point is discussed in Section 4.
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2 enjoys due to the R&D investments,  2 () +  1 (), always increase with knowledge
disclosure (Proposition 1(iii)).
Proposition 1(iv) informs us that the input price increases with knowledge disclosure.
This is a straightforward implication of the fact that disclosure increases 2’s effective R&D
investments. The latter increase the gross profits of 2.  −1 extracts 2’ higher gross
profits by charging a higher input price.
Up to now, we have seen that the knowledge disclosure impact on 2’s cost, on the
one hand, is positive due to the increase in the input price, and on the other hand, it is
negative due to the increase in 2’s effective R&D investments. Naturally, the following
question arises: What is the overall impact of knowledge disclosure on the rival’s cost? As
Proposition 1(v) states, the negative impact of knowledge disclosure dominates and the
more knowledge is disclosed, the lower is the rival’s cost.
Further, the implications of knowledge disclosure on firms’ output are similar to the
respective ones on R&D investments. In other words, 2’s output increases with , since
its cost decreases with . Respectively, 1’s output increases with  when products are
sufficiently differentiated since then  reinforces 1’s R&D investments, and thus, decreases
its cost.
We turn now to the analysis of the vertically integrated firm’s choice of the optimal
degree of knowledge disclosure.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, the vertically integrated firm optimally sets ∗ = 1.
Similarly to the case with exogenous innovation, we find that the vertically integrated
firm chooses to disclose its knowledge. Actually, it chooses to disclose all of its knowledge.
The more knowledge is disclosed, the higher is the input price and the output of the rival
downstream firm (Proposition 1(iv) and (vi)). As a consequence, the more knowledge is
disclosed, the higher are the vertically integrated entity’s profits from the input sales. The
latter effect is so strong that it dominates the negative impact of disclosure on the integrated
firm’s downstream profits.
Taking into account the fact that under vertical integration there is full knowledge
disclosure, a number of observations are in order. First, it is easy to check that the vertically
integrated firm’s R&D investments are higher than those of the downstream non-integrated
firm,  1   2 .9 This is a straightforward implication of the fact that the input is
9For notational convenience, from now on we define   ≡   (1) Similarly, for the rest of the variables.
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transferred at marginal cost within the vertically integrated firm, while the downstream non-
integrated firm suffers from double marginalization. Second, that the vertically integrated
firm’s variable cost is lower than that of the downstream non-integrated firm’s,  −  1 
+ 2 − 2 − 1 . This is so, because the burden of double marginalization is too heavy
that the cost of the downstream non-integrated firm turns out to be higher than that of the
vertically integrated firm, even though only the former firm free-rides on R&D investments.
Finally, that the vertically integrated firm’s output is higher than the downstream non-
integrated firm’s output,  1   2  Since the vertically integrated firm faces lower cost,
and thus enjoys a competitive advantage relative to its downstream rival, it follows that it
also has a larger market share.
3.3 Merger Implications and Incentives
A fundamental question we need to address is whether vertical integration leads to the
complete market foreclosure of the rival downstream firm. According to Proposition 2,
under Assumption 2, vertical integration leads to full knowledge transfer (∗ = 1). When
 = 1, Assumption 2 is always satisfied. However, when  ≥ 75 the vertically integrated
entity might prefer instead to set  such that Assumption 2 is not satisfied. Thus, it might
prefer to fully foreclose 2. In the latter case, there is a bilateral monopoly in the market
and  −1’s equilibrium profits are   = (−)
3
3 . Comparing  −1’s profits with and
without market foreclosure, we conclude that the vertically integrated entity is better off
when its downstream rival is present in the market.10
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the vertically integrated firm never fully forecloses the down-
stream non-integrated firm.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is similar to the one mentioned in the case with
exogenous innovation. We should stress again though that if we did not allow for knowledge
disclosure, we would find that vertical integration leads to full market foreclosure when
downstream competition is sufficiently strong.
The following Proposition summarizes the main implications of vertical integration with
full knowledge disclosure.
10To be more precise, this statement is true for all   1 When goods are homogenous ( = 1), the
vertically integrated firm essentially forecloses its downstream rival even when it fully discloses knowledge.
In fact, when  = 1  2 =  2 = 0
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Proposition 4 In equilibrium, vertical integration leads to an increase in
(i) the R&D investments of the vertically integrated firm,  1   1 
(ii) the R&D investments of the non-integrated downstream firm,  2   2 , if and
only if  is sufficiently low,
(iii) the effective R&D investments of the non-integrated downstream firm,  2 + 1 
 2 ,
(iv) the wholesale price,  2   2 ,
(v) the output of the vertically integrated firm,  1   1 
(vi) the output of the non-integrated downstream firm,  2   2 , if and only if  is
sufficiently low.
Vertical integration reinforces both the R&D investments and the output of the inte-
grated firm. Intuitively, under vertical separation, both downstream firms face the problem
of double marginalization and share equally the downstream market. Under vertical inte-
gration though, 1 enjoys a competitive advantage and has a larger market share relative
to its non-integrated downstream rival. It follows from this that 1’s output is larger when
it is vertically integrated. The subsequent output effect reinforces 1’s R&D investments
in the presence of integration. And in fact, it outweighs the negative impact of free-riding
on 1’s investments and leads to higher investments under integration.
Further, vertical integration increases both the R&D investments and the output of
the downstream non-integrated firm when downstream competition is not too strong. The
intuition is as follows. When downstream competition is strong, the competitive advantage
of the vertically integrated entity is more pronounced, and as a result, vertical integration
shrinks 2’s market share, and its subsequent incentives to invest in R&D. Thus, we observe
partial foreclosure of the rival downstream firm but only if the competitive pressure is rather
strong in the market. When instead downstream competition is relatively weak, since the
downstream non-integrated firm free-rides on the integrated firm’s R&D investments and
the latter are higher under vertical integration, strategic complementarity reinforces 2’s
investment incentives and results into both higher R&D investments and output under
integration.
As we mentioned in the discussion of Proposition 1(iv), when the rival downstream
firm becomes more efficient, its upstream supplier has incentives to increase the input
price. Proposition 4(iii) informs us that vertical integration increases the efficiency of the
15
downstream rival. Thus, it increases the input price (Proposition 4(iv)). As the following
Proposition states, similarly to the case with exogenous innovation, the net effect of vertical
integration on the rival’s cost is in the rival’s favor.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, vertical integration leads to a decrease in the non-integrated
downstream firm’s variable cost, +  2 −  2 −  1  + 2 −  2 .
We should note that the decrease in the rival’s cost due to vertical integration holds
more generally. In fact, it holds as long as   (), with   0 and (1) = 14.
If by assumption knowledge transfer is impossible, i.e.,  = 0, vertical integration raises
the rival’s cost. Therefore, the negative impact of vertical integration on the rival’s cost
depends crucially on the fact that we allow for the possibility of knowledge disclosure. If
we had ignored this possibility, in line with the related literature, we would have found that
vertical integration leads to a raise in rival’s cost. Clearly then, taking into account the fact
that vertical integration can give rise to the possibility of knowledge disclosure is an issue
of great importance in the evaluation of the implications of vertical integration.
Proposition 6 (i) Vertical integration always arises in equilibrium.
(ii) Vertical integration increases the profits of the non-integrated downstream firm if
and only if  is sufficiently low.
(iii) Vertical integration always increases both consumers surplus and total welfare.
Proposition 6 informs us that merger incentives always exist. It also informs us that
when downstream competition is not too strong, vertical integration increases the profits
of the downstream rival. This occurs because vertical integration increases the efficiency
of the non-integrated downstream firm and, in turn, this effect causes the expansion in
its output and profits unless downstream competition is too fierce. Vertical integration,
thus, instead of driving the downstream rival out of the market, it enhances, under certain
circumstances, the rival’s profits. Moreover, as Proposition 6(iii) states, vertical integration
also enhances both consumers surplus and total welfare. This is so because both the total
quantity produced and the total industry profits are always higher under vertical integration
than under vertical separation.
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4 Extensions and Discussion
In what follows, we examine the robustness of our findings by considering various extensions
of our model with endogenous innovation.
4.1 Knowledge Disclosure Incentives Under Vertical Separation
In our analysis so far, we assumed that only vertical integration creates the possibility of
knowledge disclosure. Naturally, one might wonder whether disclosure could occur in the
absence of vertical integration too. In order to examine this, we consider a modification of
our model in which, under vertical separation, 1 decides in stage one, how much knowledge
it will disclose to 2 regarding its own R&D investments, i.e., 1 chooses the level of .
We find that an increase in knowledge leads to an increase in 2’s R&D investments.
However, in contrast to what happens under vertical integration, under vertical separation,
an increase in knowledge disclosure weakens1’s investment incentives. This occurs because
the more knowledge is disclosed, the more 2 free-rides on 1’s investments. Since under
vertical separation 2 is only a rival of 1 and not a customer too, 1 only loses from
2’s free-riding. In equilibrium, 1 does not disclose any of its R&D knowledge to 2.11,12
Therefore, we can conclude that the existence of vertical integration is crucial for knowledge
disclosure to occur.
4.2 Two-Part Tariff Contracts
We extend now our analysis to the case in which vertical trading is conducted through
two-part tariff contracts, i.e., through contracts which consist of both a wholesale price 
per unit of input and a fixed fee-tranfer . For the analysis to be non-trivial, we consider
bargaining over two-part tariffs.13 In particular, we invoke the Nash bargaining solution
11Clearly, 1’s knowledge disclosure incentives might have been different if it could sell its knowledge to
2, e.g., through a licensing contract. As we mentioned in the Introduction, our working assumption here,
as well as throughout our analysis, is that knowledge cannot be sold.
12Note that we consider the case of only one-way knowledge disclosure from 1 to 2 so that the setting is
similar to the one under vertical integration. If we allowed for two-way knowledge disclosure (i.e., allow also
for the possibility of disclosure from 2 to 1), firms might have incentives to disclose due to the presence
of a "reciprocity effect". Milliou (2009) demonstrates this in a one-tier industry.
13Clearly, under two-part tariff contracts, when the upstream monopolist makes its take-it-or-leave-it
contract offer(s) in stage 3, it will obtain through the fixed fees all the downstream gross profits. Given
this, the downstream firms make negative profits if they undertake R&D investments in stage 2. Thus, they
choose not to invest in R&D. Therefore, a necessary condition for downstream firms to invest in R&D is to
possess some bargaining power during their negotiations with the upstream monopolist.
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and assume that the bargaining power of the upstream firm is given by , with 0 ≤  ≤ 1,
while that of the downstream firms is given by 1 − . Under vertical integration,  −1
bargains with 2 over (2 2). Under vertical separation,  1 and 2 conduct public
negotiations over both (1 1) and (2 2). This specification guarantees that the outcome
of the negotiations becomes publicly known and is non-renegotiable ex-post so that  does
not suffer from the well-known “commitment problem”.14
Under vertical separation, the solution of the last stage of the game results into the same
( ) as in the respective case in Section 3. In stage 3, firms bargain over the terms
of the two-part tariff contracts. Assuming that the downstream bargaining power 1−  is
equally split between 1 and 2, the negotiation outcome is the solution to the following
three player Nash bargaining problem:
max1122
[(1 2 1 2) + 1 + 2][1(1 2 1 2)− 1](1−)2 (19)
× [2(1 2 1 2)− 2](1−)2
where () are ’s gross (from the R&D costs) profits. Note that all players have zero
outside options. Maximizing (19) first with respect to 1 and 2 it is easy to see that the
problem reduces to the maximization of the industry’s total gross profits,  () + 1()+
2() with respect to 1 and 2. It is also easy to see that each firm’s gross profits are
proportional to the industry maximum gross profits with a factor of proportionality equal
to the firm’s bargaining power. Solving we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices in terms
of the R&D investments, ( ).
In stage 2, each chooses  in order to maximize its profits, 1−2 [ ( )+1( )+
2( )]− 2 . Solving this problem, we obtain the equilibrium R&D investments:
  = (− )(1− )7 +  + 8 . (20)
14When the negotiations of  with 1 and 2 are secret,  faces the “commitment problem” that does not
allow him to exploit its monopoly power. The monopolist’s commitment problem that has been identified
by McAfee and Schwartz (1995), Rey and Vergé (2004) and de Fontenay and Gans (2005), among others,
corresponds to  ’s inability to commit to  that it will not secretly offer a lower wholesale price to  .
 knows that  has incentives to behave opportunistically and make  an aggressive competitor in the
final product market, via a lower wholesale price  , because it can then use the fixed fee  in order to
transfer upstream the higher gross profits of  . Anticipating this,  will never agree on a wholesale price
that is not below the upstream marginal cost. As a result, if the negotiations were secret,  would have an
additional reason for integrating vertically: To avoid this commitment problem. In order to abstract from
such incentives, we assume that negotiations are public.
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Substituting in turn, we obtain the rest of the equilibrium values under vertical separation.15
Under vertical integration, the equilibrium quantities of the last stage of the game
coincide with the respective ones in Section 3. In the previous stage,  −1 bargains with
2 over 2 and 2. We assume that 2 is endowed with all the downstream bargaining
power.16 Given this, the Nash bargaining problem is:
max22
[ (2 1 2 ) + 2 −  (1)][2(2 1 2 )− 2]1− (21)
where  (2 1 2 ) and 2(2 1 2 ) are the gross (from R&D costs) profits. The
term  (1) captures the “outside option” of the vertically integrated firm. Since the
vertically integrated firm always has the option to fully foreclose 2, in case of disagreement
with the latter, its profits are equal to the gross profits that it earns when it acts as a
monopolist in the downstream market and are thus equal to (−+1)
2
4 . The outside option
of 2 continues to be null. After maximizing (21) with respect to 2, it is easy to see
that the problem reduces to the maximization of the industry’s extra joint gross profits,
 (2 1 2 ) + 2(2 1 2 )−  (1) with respect to 2 and that the latter are
split between −1 and 2 according to their bargaining powers. Note that the last term,
 (1), is independent of 2; thus, 2 is chosen in order to maximize the total industry
gross profits. The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is 2(1 2 ).
In stage 2, the two firms choose their R&D investments in order to maximize their net
profits:
max1  (1 2 ) = 

 (1) + [ (1 2 ) + 2(1 2 )−  (1)]− 21
max2 2(1 2 ) = (1− )[

 (1 2 ) + 2(1 2 )−  (1)]− 22
where  (1 2 ) and 2(1 2 ) are obtained after substituting 2(1 2 ) into
 (2 1 2 ) and 2(2 1 2 ). The resulting equilibrium R&D investments in
15These expressions are available from the authors upon request.
16This is the most unfavorable assumption for our main results to hold. An alternative, perhaps more easily
justifiable assumption, could be that the integrated entity is endowed with a bargaining power +(1−)2
i.e., the sum of the bargaining powers of its constituent parts before integration. Thus, leaving the non-
integrated downstream firm with a power of 2 insted of 
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terms of  are:
1() = (− )[3 +  + 4 − 4(1 + ) − (3− 4)
2]
9(1− 2) + [3− 4( − )2] ; (22)
2() = (− )(1− )(3 +  − 4)
9(1− 2) + [3− 4( − )2]  (23)
Note that the denominator of () is positive for all  only if  ≤ 096 Thus, we restrict
attention to  ≤ 096 hereafter. Substituting, we obtain the rest of the equilibrium values
in terms of .17 It is important to note that there is full market foreclosure, i.e., 2() ≤ 0
as long as    () ≡ (3 + )4 Assuming that  ≤ min[096 (3 + )4], we find that
   0. Hence, the vertically integrated firm optimally sets ∗ = 1. Clearly, when  = 1,
our assumption is always satisfied and thus full foreclosure does not occur. Still, one might
wonder if the integrated firm would have incentives anyway to fully foreclose its downstream
rival. It is clear that there are no such incentives because the vertically integrated firm
always obtains strictly higher profits when it does not fully forecloses 2, since then its
outside option during the negotiations is equal to its profits under full foreclosure.
Examining the robustness of our findings regarding the implications of vertical inte-
gration on the equilibrium R&D investments and quantities, we confirm that they are
qualitatively similar to the ones stated in Proposition 4. We also confirm that incentives for
vertical integration are always present. Importantly, we confirm that under two-part tariffs,
vertical integration leads again to a decrease in the rival’s variable cost and it increases
both consumers and total welfare.
4.3 Ex-post Knowledge Disclosure
In our main analysis, we assumed that the knowledge disclosure decision is taken ex-ante:
The vertically integrated firm chooses the level of  before firms invest in R&D. One might
wonder whether our results would go through if this decision was taken ex-post. In order
to examine this we consider a variation of our model in which we add a stage between stage
2 and stage 3, stage 2(b), in which  −1 chooses the level of .
With this alternative specification, under vertical separation, the equilibrium analysis
of the whole game is exactly the same as in our model with endogenous innovation. Under,
vertical integration, the equilibrium analysis for the last two stages, stage 3 and 4, is also
17These expressions are available from the authors upon request.
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the same as in our main model.
In stage 2(b),  −1 chooses  in order to maximize its profits expressed in terms of
the R&D investments and :
max  (1 2 ) = [1(1 2 )]
2 +2(1 2 )2(1 2 )− 21
We note that    0 if and only if the following assumption holds:
Assumption 3: (− )(1− )  1( − ) + 2
Interestingly, Assumption 3 coincides with the assumption which is needed in order to
guarantee that 2(1 2 )  0. It follows that when this assumption is satisfied, the
vertically integrated firm optimally sets ∗(1 2) = 1.
We move to stage 2, where firms choose their R&D investments taking into account that,
under Assumption 3, we have ∗(1 2) = 1. The resulting equilibrium R&D investments
are:
b 1 = (− )[92− [64 + (28− 3(8− ))]]148 + [64 + (−164− 3(8− 13))] ;
b 2 = 16(− )(1− )148 + [64 + (−164− 3(8− 13))] 
The above equilibrium values always satisfy Assumption 3. Therefore, when the knowledge
disclosure decision is taken ex-post, the vertically integrated firm has again incentives to
fully disclosure its R&D knowledge to its downstream rival-customer.
We find again that full foreclosure never occurs. Moreover, we find that vertical inte-
gration always leads to a decrease in rival’s cost just like in our main models. Our results
regarding the rest of the implications of vertical integration, as well as the incentives for
vertical integration are all confirmed under ex-post knowledge disclosure.
4.4 Bertrand Competition
One might wonder whether our findings continue to hold when downstream firms compete
in prices, instead of quantities. To address this, we assume now that the demand function
faced by each  is  = (1−)−+1−2 . In order to guarantee interior solutions under
all parameter values, we restrict attention to goods which are sufficiently differentiated
( ≤ 088). Doing so, we conclude that all our results hold with price competition too.
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Interestingly, when firms compete in prices, the equilibrium R&D investments, output and
profits of the downstream non-integrated firm are always higher under vertical integration
than under vertical separation.
4.5 Substitute R&D Investments
As standard in the literature on R&D investments (see e.g., d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988), we assumed that firms’ R&D investments - research paths are complements. We
examine now what happens when, instead, firms’ R&D investments are substitutes, i.e.,
when firms follow similar research paths that lead to substitute R&D outcomes (see e.g.,
Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998). When R&D investments are substitutes, knowledge transfer
from a firm to another is useful to the latter only if its own level of R&D outcome is
lower than the incoming knowledge. In particular, under vertical integration, 2’s effective
R&D investments are 2 = max[2 1] Obviously then, if 2 expects full knowledge
disclosure, it has no incentives to invest in R&D as it knows that the vertically integrated
firm has stronger incentives to invest in R&D. This case resembles the case with exogenous
innovation. In light of this, it is not surprising that we find that the vertically integrated
firm fully disclosures its knowledge to its downstream rival. It is not surprising also that
we find that the non-integrated downstream firm does not invest in R&D under vertical
integration. In contrast, both downstream firms invest in R&D under vertical separation.
This, in principle, could make 2 more efficient, and thus, create disincentives for vertical
integration. However, this negative effect is dominated by the positive implications of
vertical integration, which we also confirm here, and integration always materializes in
equilibrium.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied vertical integration taking into account the fact that it facilitates the
exchange of information between the integrated firm’s units. This allows its upstream unit
to learn the outcomes of its downstream unit’s innovation, and in turn, to disclose it to its
downstream rival-customer.
We have found that the vertically integrated firm fully discloses its knowledge to its
downstream rival. By disclosing, it increases the efficiency of its downstream rival. This
means, first, that it intensifies the downstream competition. And second, that it expands
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the downstream market size and demand, leading, in turn, to higher upstream profits.
Disclosure arises in equilibrium because it expands demand more than it intensifies compe-
tition.
We have also found that vertical integration never drives the downstream rival out of
the market, and more importantly, that it decreases instead of raises the rival’s cost. In
particular, knowledge disclosure increases the input price, and thus, increases the rival’s
cost. At the same time though, knowledge disclosure reduces the rival’s cost by allowing it
to free-ride on the integrated firm’s innovation. The reduction in rival’s cost outweighs its
increase.
We have pointed out throughout that if we had ignored the possibility of knowledge
disclosure, then in line with the existing literature, we would have confirmed vertical inte-
gration’s well known anti-competitive effect: The raising rival’s cost effect. Instead, allowing
for the possibility of knowledge disclosure, we have shown that an increase in input price due
to vertical integration does not necessarily mean that vertical integration is anti-competitive.
Importantly, we have identified a novel pro-competitive effect of vertical integration: Verti-
cal integration by leading to knowledge disclosure, improves the efficiency of the downstream
firms, increases the size of the downstream market and enhances firms’ total profits and
consumers’ surplus. It follows that the incorporation of the fact that vertical integration
can give rise to the possibility of knowledge disclosure can be an issue of great importance
in the evaluation of the implications of vertical mergers.
6 Appendix A1
Equilibrium outcomes under exogenous innovation:
(i) Vertical separation:
 1 = (−+∆)2 ;  2 = (−)2 ;
 1 = (−)(2−)+2∆2(4−2) ;  2 = (−)(2−)−∆2(4−2) ;
 1 = [(−)(2−)+2∆]
2
4(4−2)2 ;  2 = [(−)(2−)−∆]
2
4(4−2)2 ;   = (−)(2−)(−+∆)+∆
2
2(4−2) ;
  = ( 1 )2+( 2 )2+2 1  22 ;   =  + 1+ 2+  
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(ii) Vertical integration:
 2 () = (−)[8−(4−)2]+[3+4(2−2)]∆16−62 ;
 1 () = (−)(2−)(4+)+(8−2−2)∆16−62 ;  2 () = 2[(−)(1−)−(−)∆]8−32 ;
 2() = 4[(−)(2−)(4+)+(8−2−
2)∆]2
(8−32)2 ;
 () = (−)2(6−)(2−)+[8−4(2−)+2]∆2+2(−)[8+4(1−)−(4−)]∆4(8−32) ;
 () = 1()2+2()2+21()2()2 ;  () =  () +  2() +  ()
7 Appendix A2
Proof of Proposition 1 : (i) From (15) it can be checked that 
 
2  0 for all ( ) satisfying
Assumption 2.
(ii) From (14) it can be checked that 
 
1  0 if and only if   (), with   0
(0) = 619 (1) = 1 and ()   () for all   1
(iii) From (15) and (14) it can be checked that [
 
2 + 1 ]  0 for all ( ) satisfying
Assumption 2.
(iv) From (16) it can be checked that 
 
2  0 for all ( ) satisfying Assumption 2.
(v) From (16), (15) and (14) it can be checked that [+
 
2 − 2 − 1 ]  0 for all ( )
satisfying Assumption 2.
(vi) From (18) it can be checked that 
 
2  0 for all ( ) satisfying Assumption 2.
(vii) From (17) it can be checked that 
 
1  0 if and only if   (), with   0
(0) = 502 (1) = 753 and ()   () for all  ≤ 1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Using (16), (14), (15), (17) and (18), the equilibrium profits of the
vertically integrated firm in terms of  can be expressed as:
 () = (−)2[15408+2(8−32)2−2(8−32)−(12288+Γ)][180−1762+394+4(4−)(8−32)]2  (24)
where  ≡ 42−8(1 + )− 512 + 3(128 + (92− 48 − 92)),
 ≡ −192− (320− (432 + (100− 3(45− 4)))
and Γ ≡ 1888 + (−15872 + (−6944 + 3(2240 + (149− 39(8− ))))).
Taking the first derivative of (24) with respect to  it can be checked that it is always
positive under Assumption 2. As a consequence, ∗ = 1. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 3: Using (24) and setting ∗ = 1, it can be checked that  (1) 
  = (−)
3
3  The latter are the vertically integrated firm’s profits whenever fully forecloses
its downstream rival. In the latter case,  −1 is a monopolist in the downstream mar-
ket and thus sets (1) = −+12 and obtains gross profits (1) = [(1)]2 Its optimal
investment level is obtained by maximizing (1) − 21 and is equal to   = −3  As a
consequence,   = 2(−)3 and   = (−)
3
3 . ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) From (9) and (14) it can be checked that  1 (1)   1 for all

(ii) From (9) and (15) it can be checked that  2 (1)   2 if and only if   0522
(iii) From (9), (14) and (15) it can be checked that  1 (1) +  2 (1)   1 for all 
(iv) From (10) and (16) it can be checked that  2 (1)   2 for all 
(v) From (10) and (17) it can be checked that  1 (1)   1 for all 
(vi) From (10) and (18) it can be checked that  2 (1)   2 if and only if   0493 ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: From (10), (9), (16), (14) and (15) it can be checked that + 2 −
 2  + 2 (1)−  2 (1)−  1 (1) for all . ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: (i) Using (9) and (10), the equilibrium profits of the upstream
supplier and each of the downstream firms are, respectively:
  = 2(−)2(2−)2(2+)3[15+2(4−(2+))]2 ;   = (−)
2(5−2)(3−2)
[15+2(4−(2+))]2  (25)
Using (24) and (25), it can be checked that  (1)    +  1 for all  Hence, vertical
integration is always profitable for  −1
(ii) From (16), (14), (15), (17) and (18), the equilibrium profits of the non- integrated
downstream firm in terms of  can be expressed as:
 2() = 12(−)
2(3+−4)2(−2+2)(−10+32)
[180−1762+394+4(4−)(8−32)]2  (26)
Using (25) and (26) it can be checked that  2(1)   2 if and only if   0491
(iii) It is well-known that the demand functions in (1) stem from the maximization problem
of the representative consumer whose utility is (1 2) = (1+2)−(21+22+212)2+
where  is the composite good with its price normalized to 1 Exploiting symmetry under
vertical separation, it is easy to check that   = (1 + )[  ]2 and   =   +
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2  +   Under vertical integration, the respective expressions turn out to be as follows:
  = 1
2
[ 1 (1)2 +  2 (1)2 + 2 1 (1) 2 (1)];   =   +  2(1) +  (1)
Using (10), (17), (18), (25), (26) and (24) it can be checked that      and
     for all . ¥
8 Appendix B: For Referees Use Only
Equilibrium values under vertical separation and two-part tariff contracts:
  = 4(− )7 +  + 8 ;
  =
4(− )
7 +  + 8 ;
  =
(− )2(1− )(15 +  + 16)
(7 +  + 8)2 ;
  =
(− )232(1 + )
(7 +  + 8)2 
Equilibrium values under vertical integration and two-part tariff contracts:
1() = (− )[6− (3 +  + 2) + 2(1− 
2 −  + (1 + ))]
9− (4( − )2 − 3)− 92 ;
2() = 2(− )(3 +  − 4)9− (4( − )2 − 3)− 92 ;
2() = 2(− )[3− (3 + ) + 
2 + (1 +  − 2 − (1− ))]
9− (4( − )2 − 3)− 92 ;
2() = (1− )(− )
2(3 +  − 4)2(3 +  − 32)
[9− (4( − )2 − 3)− 92]2 ;
 () = (− )
2[27(1− 2)2 + [54 + 4(6− 5) − 16(6− ) −  ] + 2]
[9− (4( − )2 − 3)− 92]2 
where  = (5 + 3(6− 7))2+24(3− )3−242,  = −3− 2(3− ) + 6 + 2 − 42 and
 = −1− 2 + 2( + 2−3 + 22)
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